The last few years have witnessed the rediscovery of an old distinction between "civic" and "ethnic" nationalisms. This renaissance has been driven in part by the new prominence of nationalism on the world political scene in the wake of the events of 1989.
underrated pleasures of what Hobbes called "peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living." 1 In turn, liberalism's critics have charged that its aversion to affect is unsustainable. Modern procedural liberalism has no room for the strong passions of belonging, loyalty, and allegiance, and so it "cannot inspire the moral and civic engagement self-government requires." 2 The concern, in Roger Scruton's pithy expression, is that "the public sphere cannot stand so serenely above the loyalties that feed it." 3 The distinction between civic and ethnic nationalisms has offered liberals an attractive answer to this charge, because it promises to isolate a kind of affect upon which liberal democracies can safely rely as a source of citizen motivation. Whereas ethnic nationalism is grounded in attachment to a pre-political community of descent, civic nationalism, its proponents claim, expresses devotion to nothing other than liberaldemocratic political principles and values themselves. Thus, liberal-democratic states can inspire their citizens with civic nationalism while keeping the divisive force of other, more pernicious attachments at bay. 4 As Benjamin Barber announces: "A civic patriotism that eschews exclusion but meets the need for parochial identity can provide an alternative to the many pathological versions of blood kinship that are around today in places like ex-Yugoslavia, Romania, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Nigeria, the Ukraine, and Afghanistan, to name just a few." 5 Such theoretical deployments of the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism represent what I call the strategy of redirection. This strategy claims to render affect safe for liberal democracies by redirecting our attachment and sentiment from one subset of objects-the "ethnic"-to another subset of objects-the "civic."
Since the ethnic conveniently turns out to be the source of all of affect's pathologies, the "civic" can offer all the benefits of affect while "eschewing exclusion" at the same time.
In this essay, I argue that the strategy of redirection rests on a misleading picture of the dynamics of political affect, and in particular of the relationship between affect and the universal principles that are supposedly represented by the "civic." The project of making affect safe for liberal democracy, I claim, founders on the troubling fact that even the reproduction of civic affect proceeds by tying citizens to historical institutions and concrete cultures that are never quite equivalent to the universal principles they purport to embody.
To develop this argument, I turn to one account of political affect that has assumed a prominent place in recent debates about civic and ethnic nationalisms: Jürgen
Habermas's conception of "constitutional patriotism" (Verfassungspatriotismus). 6 Many of Habermas's readers take the idea of "constitutional patriotism" to be a version of "civic nationalism," and they understand Habermas himself to be a practitioner of what I call the strategy of redirection. 7 Yet Habermas's own writings on constitutional patriotism are not as straightforward as these interpretations suggest. Although many of
Habermas's characterizations of constitutional patriotism do suggest that he hopes to make affect safe for liberal democracy by directing it toward abstract, universal principles, there is also an important strand in Habermas's thought-call it a minor theme-that powerfully resists the strategy of redirection, and gestures toward an alternative way of thinking about political affect. This essay draws out that strand by reading Habermas's idea of constitutional patriotism both in light of his recent treatise on law and democracy, Between Facts and Norms, and in light of his concrete contributions to public discussions about nationalism, citizenship, asylum and immigration, and violence against foreigners in contemporary Germany. By reconstructing Habermas's concept of constitutional patriotism in this way, I aim to identify the limits of the strategy of making affect safe for democracy by redirecting it toward safe and proper objects; along the way, I also hope to make a little trouble for the conventional wisdom about where Habermas's work belongs on the map of contemporary political thought. 8 In the second section of this essay, I offer a preliminary reading of constitutional patriotism as an exemplar of the strategy of redirection, which tries to solve the problem relationship between the law as a system of effective sanctions and the law a system of valid norms, drawing out both the mutual dependence of these two aspects of law, and the irreducible potential for conflict between them. As long as it is understood as an example of the strategy of redirection, I claim, constitutional patriotism is caught in an analogous tension: the universal principles toward which constitutional patriotism is supposed to direct our affect are not self-sufficient, but both depend upon and are threatened by a supplement of particularity that enables them to become objects of passionate identification. In the last section of the essay, I suggest that Habermas himself, especially in his writing on concrete political events in contemporary Germany, offers a better understanding of the meaning of constitutional patriotism-one which takes account of and responds to, rather than denying or repressing, this tense relationship of conflict and interdependence between the universal and the particular. If universal normative principles always depend upon supplements of particularity that enable them to become objects of attachment and identification, but which are also never quite equivalent to the principles they purport to embody, then constitutional patriotism can best be understood not as a safe and reliable identification with some pure set of alreadyavailable universals, but rather as a political practice of refusing or resisting particular identifications-of insisting upon and making manifest this failure of equivalence-for the sake of the ongoing, always incomplete, and often unpredictable project of universalization.
5
II.
The term "constitutional patriotism" does not appear in Habermas's work until the 1980s, when he invoked the idea in the course of the Historikerstreit, a heated public debate about the uniqueness of the Holocaust and the "public use of history" in which
Habermas was a central player. 9 Rather than jumping directly into the whirlpool of German cultural politics, however, I want to begin by framing constitutional patriotism against the background of theoretical questions about the relationships among identity, rationality, and social integration in modernity-questions that had already occupied
Habermas for more than a decade when the Historikerstreit began.
In a 1974 address entitled "Can Complex Societies Form a Rational Identity,"
Habermas put his own twist on an old Hegelian theme, suggesting that modernity introduces an "inevitable cleavage between ego-identity derived from universalistic structures and collective identity bound up with a particular community." 10 For
Habermas, this cleavage was problematic because universalism both undermines and seems to depend upon the binding force of particular identities. "On the basis of universalistic norms," Habermas wrote, "no particular entity possessing an identityforming power (such as the family, the tribe, the city, state or nation) can set up bounds to demarcate itself from alien groups." Yet "if this place is not filled"-the place from which socially effective bonds issue, previously occupied by families, tribes, cities, states, and nations-"universalistic morality, in the same way as the ego structures consistent with it, would remain a mere postulate." 11 How, if at all, could this tension between the binding force of identification and the universal norms of modernity be overcome?
In the 1974 essay, Habermas's response to this problem was to suggest that modernity's universalistic morality could become self-sufficient; that is, that the "basic 6 norms of rational discourse" could themselves become the foundation of a new form of collective identity through which universal principles would acquire effectiveness and social reality. 12 This optimistic gesture echoed Habermas's contemporaneous theorization of a "postconventional" stage in the development of the ego-identity of the individual, a theme he has continued develop in more recent work. 13 On this account, the individual passes from a stage of conventional identification, in which he "blind [ly] subjugat[es]" himself to traditional social expectations and roles, into a mature stage of "postconventional" identification, in which he relates autonomously and critically to the social expectations he encounters. 14 Habermas insists that these references to the autonomy of the individual are not to be taken to mean that the individual can "step outside of society altogether and settle down into a space of abstract isolation and freedom"-even postconventional identities depend upon and make reference to the dimension of intersubjectivity. 15 But in the postconventional stage, the intersubjective has a different meaning and weight: it refers not to the actually existing others whose demands unilaterally determine the individual's identity, but rather to the "anticipated" or "projected" community of others to which the postconventional subject appeals for recognition of his unique, autonomously formed identity. 16 ethnos, or nation all attach us to pre-political objects of affect and identification-that is, objects that are imagined to exist "independent of and prior to the political opinion-and will-formation of the citizens themselves." 25 These forms of political affect seem to correspond to the conventional stage of identity-formation Habermas describes in the context of individual psychology, in which the individual secures identity only at the cost of blindly accepting the traditional roles assigned to him by others. If postconventional ego-identity is an accomplishment of the mature individual who has learned to do without the certitudes of tradition and social convention, Habermas suggests that constitutional patriotism is, correspondingly, the appropriate form of affect for a mature politics that has outgrown the need for a pre-political ground-a politics that has "learn[ed] to stand on its own two feet." Thus, rather than referring outside politics to "a prior homogeneity of descent or form of life," constitutional patriotism directs citizen allegiance toward the nation now conceived simply as a "self-determining political community."
politics while avoiding the possibility of conflict between citizens' passionate attachments and their rationally grounded moral and political obligations. Once upon a time, Habermas admits, affect directed toward the pre-political unity of the Volksnation did help create and consolidate emergent liberal-democratic states. 27 But the experience of the last few centuries of state-building has also taught us that the fantasy of a homogeneous community can only be pursued at the cost of intolerance and ethnic cleansing; and so, especially under contemporary conditions of accelerating pluralism,
Habermas insists that such methods of securing political integration must finally be abandoned. 28 The only normatively acceptable alternative is to focus political affect and identification around an increasingly abstract set of principles that can serve as a least common denominator among a "diversity of cultural life-forms, ethnic groups, religions, and worldviews." 29 Such an approach, unlike earlier forms of patriotism and nationalism, valorizes a set of universal norms rather than a concrete historical community;
consequently, it does not generate irrational, anti-democratic hostility toward an unending series of people or groups whom it positions as its "others." 30 The foregoing account of constitutional patriotism and the underlying understanding of postconventional identity-formation invite criticism in a number of ways, both at the level of individual psychology and at the level of collective identification, though I shall focus on the latter here. 31 For example, Habermas often seems to move too quickly between, on the one hand, a description of the postconventional situation, which simply refers to the fact that "societal differentiation"
and the "diversification of conflicting role expectations" have disrupted the simple, unreflective reproduction of traditional ways of life and rendered it impossible to sustain a purely conventional existence; 32 and, on the other hand, his account of postconventional forms of identification, which supposedly make it possible for us to sustain coherent egoidentities and stable collective identities even in the postconventional situation.
Habermas's rough outline of the postconventional situation is compelling-though we may want to suspend judgment on his tendency to associate that situation exclusively with Western modernity-yet his optimistic account of postconventional identity seems more problematic. Does the postconventional individual, simply by virtue of being thrown into a context in which no single conventional identity can serve as an unproblematic guide to action, somehow become so well-insulated from the weight of history and of social expectations that he can treat his historical and cultural context solely as raw material, to be incorporated critically and selectively into an autonomously shaped life? Can the abstract, universal principles around which postconventional collective identities are to be centered really command passionate attachment prior to and independently of identification with concrete historical communities, such that they can serve as a critical "filter" through which "national pride and collective self-esteem" can be passed, screening out their undesirable aspects? 33 Or, to the contrary, does the reproduction even of civic and principled forms of identity proceed precisely by appealing to, rather than overcoming, the weightiness of the historical institutions and concrete cultures to which we find ourselves bound even prior to the process of critical reflection? If so, might the postconventional situation demand not that we search for a distinctive and safe form of identity, but that we adopt an ambivalent posture toward identification as such?
Surprisingly enough, I shall suggest, Habermas himself turns out to support this latter, less sanguine perspective on the possibility of postconventional identity, thereby undergirding a powerful and subtle critique of the whole strategy of rendering affect safe for liberal democracy by splitting it into "safe" and "dangerous" variants. To understand
Habermas's critique, however, we need to leave constitutional patriotism behind for the moment and turn to Habermas's monumental recent treatise on law and democracy.
III. 34 Habermas tries to overcome the false reduction of law to one or the other of these aspects, describing law instead as a point of intersection or "mediation" between facts and norms: "Legal norms," Habermas says, "are at the same time but in different respects enforceable laws based on coercion and laws of freedom" (29, emphases added). 35 The phrase "at the same time but in different respects" is a placeholder for a complex relationship of conflict and interdependence. First, facticity and validity stand in a relation of potential conflict. This point should already be familiar from Habermas's earlier description of the "cleavage" between concrete identities and universal norms in modernity. And, once again, Habermas explains the cleavage by telling a story about the birth of modernity. Modernity, he suggests, disturbs two other, older connections between facts and norms, which were sustained by "background assumptions, loyalties and skills" that we "always already" possess by virtue of our immersion in the lifeworld (22) , and by "archaic institutions that present themselves with an apparently unassailable claim to authority" (23) . Background knowledge is a sheer fact about us; we use it "involuntarily, without reflectively knowing that we possess it at all" (22) ; yet background knowledge is also ours: it does not compel us, but reflects our "intuitive" understanding of what ought to be done, and so maintains a tie to the dimension of validity (23) . Likewise, the archaic institution is both a sheer fact that "imperiously confronts" people with threats of coercion, and an essential source of validity in societies where individuals are simply defined by their relationships to the collectivity. 36 In these cases, however, we encounter not just an intersection but a "fusion" of facticity and validity (23) . In background knowledge and archaic institutions, we might say that the factical exhausts the normative, and thus remains insulated from criticism and challenge (25) . In "modern societies," by contrast, social complexity, differentiation, and pluralization have contributed to the "disenchantment" of both conventional know-how 13 and sacred authority (25) . For us, Habermas says, "validity and facticity-that is, the binding force of rationally motivated beliefs and the imposed force of external sanctions-have parted company as incompatible" (26) . Thus, the phenomenon that characteristically links facticity and validity together in modernity-the law-can only "mediate," and cannot reconcile, the tension between them.
But if facticity and validity have "parted company as incompatible" in modernity,
why not let them go their separate ways, which is (after all) what Habermas thinks systems theory and normative political philosophy have done? The answer is that although facticity and validity are incompatible, they are also interdependent. This interdependence of facts and norms has two faces. First, Habermas argues, law can perform its (factical) function of securing social integration in modernity only if it is more than a system of effective sanctions: it must also satisfy normative criteria.
Modern law can stabilize behavioral expectations in a complex society with structurally differentiated lifeworlds and functionally independent subsystems only if law, as regent for a "societal community" that has transformed itself into civil society, can maintain the inherited claim to solidarity in the abstract form of an acceptable claim to legitimacy (76) .
Conversely-and much more importantly for our purposes-Habermas also argues that validity is inevitably intertwined with the factical dimensions of law and politics, and this is the argument that represents the most substantial departure from his earlier gesture toward the possible self-sufficiency of universal norms. This moment of interdependence arises most fundamentally from the incapacity of practical reason alone to motivate moral action-a gap which only a system of legal sanctions can fill. 37 In modernity, Habermas argues, morality has become detached from the "customary practices" that once gave it a strong motivating force. As mere knowledge, however, morality possesses only the The law provides this supplement, Habermas says, because consists of a system of incentives and punishments that produces external conformity to norms, though from wholly amoral motives. "Coercive law overlays normative expectations with threats of sanctions in such a way that addressees may restrict themselves to the prudential calculation of consequences" (116). In order to function in this way as a motivational supplement to practical reason, however, law must be more than a set of valid norms, for the merely philosophical specification of such norms would still lack the power of sanction. Thus, an effective system of law must involve the creation of "specific rights,"
which "stem from the decisions of a historical legislature" (125). Moreover, because these rights have a historically specific genesis and govern a socially and geographically discrete collectivity, a valid legal order must include "rights that regulate membership in a determinate association of citizens," and which allow us to "differentiate between members and nonmembers, citizens and aliens" (124). Yet, since considerations of validity cannot themselves establish "proper" boundaries between determinate communities, abstract normative principles demand a further supplement of particularity from "historical chance [and] the accidental course of events," which define the territory and membership to which historically specific systems of positive law apply. 38 Finally, even a historically specific system of basic rights applied to a determinate association of citizens would remain "incomplete in essential respects," because a system of rights "cannot stabilize itself" without the further creation of a political institution-the constitutional state-to reproduce, implement, and enforce the law (132).
In its dependence upon the sanctioning power of a specific body of positive law, applicable to a territorially and historically delimited community, and backed up by the coercive power of the institutions of the state, the normative core of law refers beyond itself, toward its own factical particularization. This dependence keeps the normative core of law involved in a dangerous, uneasy alliance with institutions that threaten to displace and overwhelm it (39). As we shall see, this fragile structure of conflict and interdependence also provides a useful framework for understanding the problem of identity and affect in modernity, and will help us understand the problems encountered by all attempts to solve the problem of political affect through the strategy of redirectionHabermas's included.
IV.
In Law and the state produce identifications by addressing people as citizens-that is, as both subjects and authors of the institutional order that governs a given territory.
When arrests are made, when votes are taken, when juries are assembled, when cars are registered, when taxes are assessed, and so on, the participants in these moments of interpellation are made and remade into members of an "imagined community" of citizens. 39 In this way-as Habermas himself acknowledges in his account of the rise of the European nation-state-law and the state mediate between citizens, creating a "new and more abstract form of social integration" by tying each person to a single, central idea: the idea of "the people" to which all belong. 40 While positive law fills in the motivational deficits of practical reason by imposing effective sanctions that appeal to self-interest, the production of identifications fills in these same deficits in a different way: by broadening the reference of the "self" in "self-interest" to include the members, institutions, and practices of a community that we come to regard as ours, or even as "us." 41 This analogy between the motivational effects of legal sanctions and the motivational effects of legally and politically produced identifications suggests, however, that identifications may be caught in the tension between facticity and validity in the same way as sanctions. Legal sanctions, remember, represented one point of interdependence between facts and norms: universal legal norms can only become effective as sanctions if they are embodied in a particular system of positive law and coercive state apparatus, the particularity of which is not given (and cannot be given) by norms themselves, but provided by the supplement of facticity. Something similar holds true for identification. For the interpellating address of law and the state to identify people effectively as members of some "imagined community" of citizens, that community must indeed be imagined; it must be given some definite shape, even if the definition of the community remains subject to interpretation and re-imagination through practices of cultural politics. Moreover, this definite shape cannot be given by the abstract normative core of law and politics itself: identification, too, must reach beyond the normative and toward the factical in order to obtain its necessary supplement of particularity. Habermas makes the point himself: "The identity of a person, of a group, of a nation or of a region," he says, "is always something concrete, something particular"; it requires the presentation of an "image" to oneself and others, and it "can never consist merely in general moral orientations and characteristics, which are shared by all alike." 42 The tension between the normative and the factical in the context of identification is well-illustrated by Habermas's treatment of popular sovereignty. In order to create sufficiently strong identifications to sustain social integration, Habermas suggests, the image of the community to which citizens belong has to be given more definition than the "abstract" idea of popular sovereignty, on its own, can provide. The problem here is that the idea of "the people" that lies behind the normative principle of popular sovereigntythe pure demos-does not correspond to any "visibly identifiable gathering of autonomous citizens." 43 The will of the people resists all representation: it "withdraws" into a "subjectless and anonymous state"; it becomes "elusive," leaving its traces and effects but never becoming present. 44 In its elusiveness, however, the pure demos also frustrates identification: it offers no images in which citizens can find themselves mirrored. Identification with the "people," which is a necessary component of effective social integration around the principle of popular sovereignty, thus requires some extranormative supplement to give substantiality to the demos.
But this means that identification with the demos constitutively involves
misrecognition, since the demos is never equivalent to any purported representation of it.
Historically, Habermas observes, the figure of the nation as a cultural, linguistic, and historical unity has often filled the gap left by the demos, serving as a "cultural substrate" that would be "vivid and powerful enough to shape people's convictions and appealed more strongly to their hearts and minds than the dry ideas of popular sovereignty and human rights." 45 Yet in filling this gap, nationalism performs a twofold misrecognition:
first, the nation never is the pre-politically given entity it purports to be, but is instead produced as a pre-political "fact" in the very same act of address that produces the individual as citizen. 46 And, second, the demos never is the historical, linguistic, and cultural unity represented by the image of the nation; such an image is, at best, the trace of the "people," the sloughed skin of a demos on the move. Habermas thus says that the "republican achievement [of the national state] is endangered when, conversely, the integrative force of the nation of citizens is traced back to a prepolitical fact of a quasinatural people"-yet it is also true that the republican core of the state exposes itself to this danger by virtue of its dependence on a supplement of particularity. The normative principles of law and politics invite the very "naturalistic conception of the people" that also threatens them.
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This dynamic of dependence and threat creates serious difficulties for the project of constitutional patriotism-at least as long as that project is understood in terms of the redirection of political attachment and affect toward safe and proper objects. As we saw earlier, Habermas's original image of constitutional patriotism posited the possibility of reproducing identification with and loyalty to abstract normative principles independently of any identification with particular national or historical communities. This prior attachment to universal principles was supposed to serve as a "filter" that could screen out the dangerous elements of national pride and historical consciousness. 48 On this account, only after we have established an independent affective connection to normative principles will we be properly equipped to decide "which of our traditions we want to continue and which we do not." 49 Yet Habermas's own reflections about the interdependence of facticity and validity suggest that this kind of attachment to pure principle is impossible: the norms "behind" a constitution can only become objects of identification and loyalty via an admixture of particularity. 50 This point has not been lost on Habermas himself. After his initial contributions to the Historikerstreit, and perhaps in a tacit response to critics who had complained about the apparent thinness of constitutional patriotism, the terms of Habermas's own account of political affect shifted in a slight but vital way. His Sonning Prize speech, for example, glosses constitutional patriotism not as loyalty to universal principles but as attachment to "the political order and the principles of the Basic Law"-that is, to a set of particular institutions and a historical constitution. 51 The same speech later returns to more abstract formulations of constitutional patriotism, but immediately adds: "Of course constitutional patriotism's ties to these principles have to be nourished by a heritage of cultural traditions that is consonant with them." 52 Elsewhere, Habermas refers to constitutional patriotism as a way of "enduringly link[ing]" principles "with the motivations and convictions of citizens" by "situat[ing]" these principles "within the historical context of a legal community." 53 And often, Habermas now simply refers to a "shared political culture" as the supplement of particularity that abstract principles require if they are to become objects of attachment and affect. 54 Even here, Habermas's impulse to make affect safe for democracy does reassert itself: in a final defense of the strategy of redirection, Habermas suggests that nationalisms grounded in this way in the "shared political culture" and "institutions" of a polity, precisely because they are political, do not bear the "ambivalent potential" that had made "pre-political" conceptions of nationhood at once a resource for and a danger to liberal-democratic politics. 55 This, however, confuses two senses of "political." Take the example of culture: to say that the political culture of a community is "political" is to name the segment of society to which that culture belongs: the political culture is "political" in the sense that it pertains to institutions and practices of governance, 20 decision-making, or the allocation and use of power. The modifier "political" carries a much different sense as a component of the distinction between "political" and "prepolitical." Consider again how Habermas uses this distinction:
But this republican achievement is endangered when, conversely, the integrative force of the nation of citizens is traced back to a prepolitical fact of a quasi-natural people-that is, to something independent of and prior to the political opinion-and will-formation of the citizens themselves.
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In this sense, the political culture of a community, too, is something pre-political. The content of the constitution and the particular interpretations that constitution has been given over a long history of adjudication; the political history of the country; the symbols, songs, events, dates, and people who capture our political imagination; the patterns and structures of civil society; the vocabularies of political analysis and polemic, the "national fantasies" that "circulate through personal/collective consciousness"
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-all these and more constitute a cultural inheritance that the demos did not choose. This is not to say that political culture is fixed or that we are completely determined by it: the political culture we leave behind is never the same as the one we first found, and some of that change is due to precisely the kind of cultural critique and transformation that
Habermas rightly urges us to practice. But that, after all, is not uniquely true of political culture; it is true of culture in general. And, conversely, what is true of culture in general is also true of political culture. Its givenness, its facticity, lends it the particularity it needs to become the focus of an "imagined community" of passionate identification; yet, at the same time, political culture is neither as unified and coherent as our representations of it suggest, nor is it as purely expressive of universal principles as we believe.
Consequently, we constitutively misrecognize ourselves in our "shared political culture" or "common institutions" just as much as we do in other nationalisms. And, just as in other nationalisms, the narcissistic defense of a common political identity has the capacity to inspire violence and exclusion. 58 This is not to say that civic and ethnic nationalism are equivalent, or that there are no good reasons to prefer, for example, civic over ethnic rules of political membership-but it does suggest that the practice even of constitutional patriotism or other forms of civic nationalism carries political risks analogous to those borne by other nationalisms, and that the strategy of redirection, with its promise of a safe form of political affect, leads us to overlook these dangers.
Though Habermas's final theoretical defense of the strategy of redirection is not ultimately persuasive, Habermas's own practice of cultivating constitutional patriotism through his interventions into German public life does rather elegantly exemplify the tensions that come to inhabit even civic attachments. In his second major contribution to the Historikerstreit, entitled "On the Public Use of History," Habermas already saw the necessity of grounding political affect not in abstractions but in concrete historical phenomena. Writing in Die Zeit to a broad public audience, Habermas made a powerful argument against the revisionist historians by describing, in the first-person plural, the obligations of remembrance, solidarity, and critical fortitude that the fact of Auschwitzthe memory of which is itself a part of German political culture-imposes on "us." 59 Habermas's address assigns these obligations by, we might say, interpellating the author himself and his readers in an imagined-and therefore determinate-community.
Precisely in the service of constitutional patriotism, Habermas invokes a historical community of descent that imposes unchosen and inescapable obligations on its members. He writes:
Our own life is linked to the life context in which Auschwitz was possible not by contingent circumstances but intrinsically. This invocation of a community defined by supposedly "pre-political" ties in the course of a struggle to instill loyalty toward constitutional principles is not a contradiction. It is an expression of the interdependence of validity and facticity in the context of identification, an interdependence that also has its dangers. In this passage, which ought to provoke our admiration even while it makes us nervous, the strategy of making affect safe for democracy through redirection finds its limit. "the demonstrators were defending the standards of civic intercourse which were acquired and partly taken for granted in the old Federal Republic." 68 This might be taken to mean that, for Habermas, the demonstrations exemplify constitutional patriotism because they are grounded in a passionate identification with a certain set of abstract principles-the "standards of civic intercourse"-that had been betrayed by the neo-Nazi attacks.
But Habermas's text and the details of the case suggest that the dynamics of political affect here are more complicated and subtle than the strategy of redirection would allow. Notice, for example, how Habermas draws a close association between constitutional patriotism and the affective postures of "empathy" and "democratic indignation." Indeed, these postures were prominently visible in the public demonstrations and vigils after Mölln. Protesters carried signs bearing such slogans as "We are all Turks" and "In solidarity and mourning for our fellow-citizens"; in Hamburg, at least 10,000 people-equivalent to more than half the population of Mölln-attended the funeral service for the three murdered women. 69 And this responsiveness to suffering, at least in some cases, also generated expressions of shame and anger over the behavior of the German state. The enormous Munich demonstration was launched "under the motto 'Munich: A City Says No,'" and the event's organizers made clear that its purpose was to say "no" not just to neo-Nazi violence but also to the Kohl government's failure to respond quickly and forcefully to earlier attacks. "By participating," the organizers said, "people will show that we do not accept attacks on hostels for asylum-seekers, vandalism of Jewish cemeteries and assaults on foreigners, that we are ashamed by the helplessness and slowness of our Government, and that we are increasingly ready to defend democracy." 70 Some demonstrators went further, suggesting that the state's inaction was not a simple omission, but part of a scheme by Kohl and the Christian Democrats to drum up public support for a more restrictive asylum policy. Thus, some protesters in Mölln chanted the slogan "Deutsche Polizisten schützen die Faschisten"-"German politicians are protecting the fascists"-and a letter to the editor in the Hamburg edition of the leftwing Tageszeitung called for citizens to protest against the "politicians of this republic, who, through the debate around refugees and immigrants, have fomented 'race'-hatred and instrumentalized it for their populist purposes." 71 To be sure, the demonstrations were not unambiguously politicized in this way.
The later and larger candlelight vigils seem to have drawn huge crowds at least in part because they seemed safely apolitical. 72 Some critics who, like Habermas, hoped for vocal displays of "democratic indignation" publicly criticized the vigils for just this reason, suggesting that they were narcissistic affairs that merely soothed the consciences of the participants. 73 Whether Habermas was right or wrong in his generous estimate of the overall significance of the demonstrations, the important point is that for him, the aspect of the demonstrations that exemplified constitutional patriotism was the aspect that exceeded the narcissistic affirmation of a collective German identity. Earlier in the same article, Habermas had criticized an editorial published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine the day after the attack in Mölln for just such a self-reassuring posture. 74 The editorial never mentioned what Habermas calls the "complicity of officialdom" in the attacks; instead, it downplayed any possible connection between the attack and the public discourse around asylum policy, and portrayed "the republic," and even the "representatives of 'the system,'" as either the actual or possible targets of right-wing extremism, just like the murdered Turkish women. Consequently, the editorial suggested that there was "no call for mass demonstrations"; instead, it pleaded for "sympathy, attentiveness, and vigilance," which did not need to be grounded in a "love for foreigners" but could rest 27 instead on "love for one's country, which should not be exposed to shame." 75 Like the advocates of the strategy of redirection, in other words, the Frankfurter Allgemeine editorial assumes that by cultivating a positive attachment to some central imaginary object-the German republic-it could help check the spread of violence and racism in the newly unified Germany. For Habermas, by contrast, the demonstrations were important not because they expressed an identity but because they resisted an identification; that is, because they refused the claim of the state to be a true or adequate instantiation of the will of the German people. The solidarity, anger, and shame generated by the combination of right-wing violence and government complicity suddenly and momentarily made what Habermas calls the "elusiveness" of the demos manifest: on the streets of Mölln and Munich, the people sloughed the skin of the German state. This is by no means an endorsement of mob rule over the rule of law: the masses in the streets were not a true or adequate instantiation of the will of the German people either, though such spectacles do invite populist misinterpretations. The demos as such did not appear on those days, but its trace could be seen in the gap or space that suddenly opened up between the crowds in the streets and the officials in Bonn. 76 If normative principles always depend upon supplements of particularity that enable them to become objects of attachment and identification, but which are also never quite equivalent to the principles they purport to embody, then perhaps constitutional patriotism is best understood not as a safe and reliable identification with some pure set of always-already available universals, but rather as a fragile political culture that habitually insists upon and makes manifest this failure of equivalence for the sake of the ongoing, always incomplete, and often unpredictable project of universalization. 
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